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ORIGINAL RESEARCH |
From the 1Unit of Epidemiology, Ospedale Pediatrico Bambino Gesù, Roma, Italy; 2Reproductive Sciences Section, Department of Cancer Studies and Molecular Medicine, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom; 3Department of Medical Ethics, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden; INSERM 4Epidemiological Research Unit on Perinatal and Womens Health, Villejuif Cedex, France; Université Pierre et Marie Curie-Paris 6, Paris, France, INSERM Research Unit in Epidemiology and Public Health, Toulouse Cedex, France; 6Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Amsterdam Medical Centre, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; 7Unit of Epidemiology, Regional Health Agency of Tuscany, Florence, Italy; 8Valencian School of Health Studies, Valencia, Spain; 9Klinikum Ludwigsburg, Frauenklinik, Ludwigsburg, Germany; 10Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Lund University Hospital, Lund, Sweden; and 11Division of Epidemiology, IFC-National Research Council, Pisa, Italy.
| ABSTRACT |
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METHODS: Obstetricians attitudes in response to a hypothetical clinical case were surveyed through an anonymous, self-administered questionnaire. The sample included 1,530 obstetricians (response rate 77%) from 105 maternity units (response rate 70%) in eight countries: France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
RESULTS: In every country, the majority of obstetricians would keep trying to persuade the woman, telling her that failure to perform cesarean delivery might result in the fetus surviving with disability, or even that her own life might be endangered. In Spain, France, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, Germany and Luxembourg, a consistent proportion of physicians would seek a court order to protect fetal welfare or avoid possible legal liability or both. In the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Netherlands, several respondents (59%, 41%, and 37%, respectively) would accept the womans decision and assist vaginal delivery. Only a small minority (from 0 in the United Kingdom to 10% in France) would proceed with cesarean delivery without a court order.
CONCLUSION: Case law arising from a few countries (United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom) and professional guidelines favoring womens autonomy have not solved the underlying ethical conflict, and in Europe acceptance of a womans right to refuse cesarean delivery, at least in emergency situations, is not uniform. Differing attitudes between obstetricians from the eight countries may reflect diverse legal and ethical environments.
LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: III
| MATERIALS AND METHODS |
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Out of 149 invited maternity units, 105 agreed to take part, corresponding to an overall unit response rate of 70% (100% in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Luxembourg; 85% in Italy; 75% in Spain; 65% in the United Kingdom; 53% in France; and 41% in Germany). Completed questionnaires were returned from 1,530 obstetricians, a staff response rate of 77%. National response rates are presented in Table 1.
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Data collection took place in 20012002. A structured questionnaire was used to survey the obstetricians self-reported practices and attitudes in five major areas: prenatal ultrasound examination, late termination of pregnancy, management of severe prematurity, situations of conflicting opinions between staff and the women, and legal concerns in obstetric practice. The questionnaire was anonymous and self-administered to protect confidentiality. It was developed in English and translated into national languages. A back-translation into English was done to check the accuracy of the translation and ensure identical semantic content.
This paper explores the obstetricians attitudes toward a womans refusal of cesarean delivery that was deemed medically necessary because of acute fetal distress. Respondents were presented with a detailed description of a fictitious but paradigmatic case (Table 2) and were asked whether they would a) accept the womans decision and assist vaginal delivery; b) seek an emergency court order to override the womans refusal; or c) proceed with cesarean delivery without such order. The type of information provided to the woman and the obstetricians motives for seeking a court order were explored as well. Respondents were asked to report their selected actions according to a three-point scale (yes, maybe, or no); only the proportion of "yes" answers is reported in the tables.
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Statistical analysis was carried out with the STATA 8.0 (Stata Corporation, College Station, TX). Weights, computed as the inverse of the probability for a given maternity unit to be selected within a certain country and geographical stratum, were applied to take into account the different sampling fractions adopted in the participating countries.21,22 Standard errors were adjusted for intracluster correlation, that is, the nonindependence of observations within the same maternity unit.22
Unless stated otherwise, results are presented as weighted proportions and 95% confidence intervals. Multivariable logistic regression analysis was used to explore factors associated with an obstetricians self-reported choice to accept the womans decision and assist vaginal delivery (yes versus maybe or no). Together with country, the following variables were considered for inclusion in the multivariable model: physicians sociodemographic and personal characteristics (age, sex, having children, being married or living with a partner, religious affiliation, and the importance attributed to religion in ones life); professional variables (position, length of experience in obstetrics and in delivery room assistance, full-time versus part-time hospital appointment, and private practice involvement); and variables related to the unit (university affiliation, being a referral center for high-risk pregnancies, unit cesarean delivery rates). Forward and backward selection procedures were implemented, retaining in the final model the variable of sex, along with those variables consistently showing a statistical significance (P
.05) in both procedures.
| RESULTS |
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Most respondents in Italy, Spain, and Luxembourg were Roman Catholic, whereas in Germany and Sweden the majority were Protestant. A small minority of respondents in Italy, Spain, and Germany reported that they considered religion not at all important in their lives, whereas in the other countries this view was expressed by an appreciably higher proportion, ranging from one fourth to over one third of respondents.
Table 2 shows the obstetricians attitudes toward a womans refusal of a cesarean delivery that was deemed necessary because of acute fetal distress. In every country, the vast majority of obstetricians stated that they would keep trying to persuade the woman to consent to cesarean delivery, telling her that failure to do so might result in the fetus surviving with a disability or even, in Germany and France especially, that her own life might be in danger. In Spain, France, Italy, and to a lesser extent, Germany and Luxembourg, a considerable proportion of physicians would seek a court order, either to safeguard fetal welfare or to avoid possible legal liability or both. In contrast, most respondents in the United Kingdom (59%), Sweden (41%), and Netherlands (37%) would accept the womans decision and assist vaginal delivery. In every country, only a small minority (ranging from 0 in the United Kingdom to 10% in France) would proceed with cesarean delivery without seeking a court order.
Table 3 shows the results of the multivariable logistic model exploring the factors associated with the obstetricians answer that they would accept the womans decision and assist vaginal deliverya variable which was chosen as a model outcome among the other possible responses (Table 2) because it indicates a clear-cut acceptance of the womans choice. Odds ratios (OR) greater than 1 indicate an increased willingness, and those less than 1 indicate a decreased willingness to comply with the womans choice compared with the reference category.
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Being married or living with a partner, considering religion as "not at all" important in ones life, and working in a university-affiliated unit increased the likelihood of an obstetricians reporting compliance with the womans will. In contrast, age over 30, being the head, deputy, or adjunct head of the unit, recent routine delivery room practice for at least 1 year, and working part-time in the hospital all decreased such a likelihood. Differences between countries remained statistically significant, with respondents in the United Kingdom being largely the most likely and those in Spain, France, and Italy the least likely to accept the womans decision.
| DISCUSSION |
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To our knowledge, this is the only international study providing comparable data on physicians attitudes toward coerced cesarean delivery. The overall high physician response rate within the recruited units (77%) supports the validity of our findings, although the lower unit recruitment fraction of some countries, mainly due to organizational reasons, may have impaired representativeness at the national level.
The kind of north-south divide found in this study has been reported in other areas of clinical medicine, such as patients information provision and forgoing life support in adult intensive care,23,24 parents visiting policies in the neonatal nursery, and involvement in decisions.21 A previous study from this same EUROBS project confirms the influence of nationality on obstetricians acceptance of women choices.25 Different legislation may have an influence. In the United Kingdom, a fetus has no legal status.16 The legal position was further clarified when a court of appeals pronounced that a competent woman could choose not to have medical intervention, even if the consequence might be the death or serious handicap of the child she bore or her own death.12,26 Similarly, in Sweden the fetus does not have any legal rights until it is born and shows signs of life. The constitutional law about health care guarantees the woman respect for her right to self-determination and integrity, including the right to refuse any medical investigation and treatment.
Also in Italy the Constitution supports the right of a competent adult to reject medical treatment.27 However, Italian law is strongly protective of human life, particularly when children and neonates are involved; immediately before being born, a fetus is assumed to have the same rights as a neonate. Thus, although no cases of court-enforced cesarean deliveries have been reported in Italy, physicians may view a court opinion as a safeguard against claims of negligence, particularly in a situation of emergency that could later give rise to doubts about the appropriateness of the information provided or the accuracy of ascertainment of patients competence.
In France, the findings of a qualitative study carried out, within this same EUROBS project, through in-depth personal interviews with a small sample of obstetricians and midwives28 may shed light on the reasons underlying the French position. Most respondents stated that situations of maternal-fetal conflict are extremely rare, almost always concerning women from other countries (mainly African) and cultures. They indicated that cesarean deliveries would always be carried out eventually, either by the woman finally accepting medical advice or, more rarely, through a court order. Less often they would tell the woman that without surgery the baby would die. One obstetrician mentioned the possibility of using sedatives to overcome the womans opposition (M. Garel, unpublished findings, 2000), a finding that may shed light on the lack of womens resistance, which is sometimes reported in instances of coerced cesarean delivery.5 Overall, the ethical values emerging from these interviews seem consistent with the emphasis on beneficence, rather than on patients autonomy, which is said to prevail in France.29 They are probably common in other European countries as well, as indicated by our finding that a nonnegligible proportion of respondents would stretch the arguments to persuade the woman by telling her that her own life might be in danger, despite there being no hint of this risk contained in the case description.
In the last decades, the progress of medical technology has rendered the fetus more "visible" within the mothers womb30 and increasingly accessible to medical intervention. Consequently, the idea of "the fetus as a patient" has gradually emerged, and the old notion of "maternal-fetal dyad" has been replaced by the "two-persons" model.
Yet, all preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic interventions must still be carried out through the womans body. When for any reason the woman refuses to comply, a situation of maternal-fetal conflict is said to arise: a term that has been criticized on the grounds that it would wrongly place the site of disagreement between the mother and her fetus, rather than between the mother and health care providers who have their own (perhaps incorrect) views of the best course of action.7
The issue of coerced cesarean delivery for acute fetal distress is minor in terms of occurrence frequency, but it is important as a clear-cut example of such a conflict of values. That the adoption of the two-persons model of obstetric care may have radicalized the conflict is shown in the writings of Chervenak et al,5 who suggested that beneficence-based obligations toward the term fetal patient provide a sufficient ethical justification for emergency coerced cesarean delivery, even in the absence of court ordera view that is shared also by the authors of a much more recent paper.9
In contrast, Mattingly32 follows a different line of reasoning to show that the two-persons model does not, in her opinion, grant the fetus any greater protection. Mattingly agrees that, because of parental responsibility and because she has made the decision to carry on with the pregnancy in the first place, a woman has a positive duty of beneficence, and a negative one of nonmaleficence, toward her term or near-term fetus. Failure to honor such duties by a competent, informed woman may well disqualify her as natural proxy decision maker for the fetus. Nevertheless, any different decision reached by an alternative proxy, whether it be the father, the physician, or even the court, will always require the womans consent to be implemented through her own body.32 This reasoning provides the ethical basis for the pronouncements of professional organizations and appellate courts, which, without denying the beneficence obligations toward the fetus, have nevertheless reaffirmed the right of a competent woman to her bodily integrity. In fact, the courts of every country have so far been reluctant to order other competent adults to undergo medical or surgical procedures for the benefit of another person, even when refusal entails the death of such person.6 It is argued that making pregnancy an exception would open also for such cases, as well as possibly discouraging some women most at risk from seeking appropriate prenatal care (Beech BA. Court ordered caesarean sections are discouraging women from seeking obstetric care [letter]. BMJ 1997;314:1908.). Yet, such a conclusion may be extremely hard for the clinician to accept, as our findings clearly show, particularly in countries where the concept of patients autonomy is less strongly valued.
When coercion by means of a court order is no longer an option, what are the alternatives for the obstetrician who, in his or her best judgement, aims at preventing damage to the fetus? In their discussion of the ethics of informed consent, Beauchamp and Childress33 differentiate between persuasion, ie, influence by appeal to reason, and the various forms of manipulation, including deception. While the first is definitely part of a clinicians duty, manipulation may represent a violation of patients autonomy. In our study, the possible use of sedation suggested by the qualitative interviews carried out in France and the agreement with the argument of danger to the womans health reported by some respondents in various countries suggest that sometimes the line between persuasion and manipulation might become blurred.
With the exception of clear-cut cases of a patients incompetence, persuasion remains the main noncontroversial option. It requires both the existence of a firm patient-physician trust relationship and the exploration of a womans preferences and values since early gestation. The physician should adopt, as suggested by Harris,34 a broader perspective, taking into account socioeconomic, cultural, and racial inequalities, to achieve fetal well-being through promotion of maternal well-being. In contrast with the traditional "conflict of rights" framework, this "care-based" approach would maximize the chances for "prevention, rather than criminalization, of prenatal harm."34
| APPENDIX |
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List of Participating Obstetrics Units
| Footnotes |
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The results presented in this paper are part of the European Concerted Action project EUROBS on "Developments of perinatal technology and ethical decision-making during pregnancy and birth: the obstetricians perspective" funded by the European Commission (contract no. BMH4-CT983376; project coordinator, Marina Cuttini, IRCCS Burlo Garofolo, Trieste).
The authors thank Michael Hills for acting as statistical advisor and the IRTEF Institute for data management.
Corresponding author: Marina Cuttini, MD, MPH, PhD, Unit of Epidemiology, Ospedale Pediatrico Bambino Gesù, Piazza S. Onofrio 4, 00165 Roma, Italy; e-mail: cuttini{at}opbg.net. ![]()
doi:10.1097/01.AOG.0000239123.10646.4c
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